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Cross-Endorsement by Political Parties:
A “Very Pretty Jungle”?
Celia Curtis*
Since its beginning, America’s political landscape has pri-
marily been dominated by two parties.1  The reasons for this are
many and the phenomenon has been widely documented.2  De-
* B.A., Fairfield University; M.B.A., Columbia Business School; J.D. Candi-
date 2010, Pace Law School.
1. Two groups emerged from the reordering of government that followed the
American Revolution: the Federalist Party, which won the first presidential elec-
tion, and the Anti-Federalists.  Dissatisfied with the direction in which the Feder-
alists were heading, Thomas Jefferson organized the opposition into the
Democratic-Republican party around 1792.  The Democratic-Republicans re-
mained dominant into the 1820s when the Federalist Party ceased to exist.  There-
after, two new parties emerged: Andrew Jackson’s followers formed the
Democratic Party and Henry Clay’s followers adopted the name “Whigs” to indi-
cate their disapproval of “King Andrew.”  The Whigs were a force for six presiden-
tial election cycles (twice winning the Presidency), but were ultimately badly
divided and by 1856, their followers had joined either the Democratic Party or the
new Republican Party. WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE, THIRD-PARTY MOVEMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 8-12 (1962).  The Democrats and Republicans have endured as the
two dominant parties.  Of course, there have been many third parties in our his-
tory, among them the Equal Rights Party, the Loco-Foco Party, the Farmer-Labor
Party, the Socialists, Women’s Righters, Greenbackers, Vegetarians, Free-Soilers,
Populists, Communists, Anti-Masons, Prohibitionists, Workers, Constitutional
Unionists, Antimonopolyites, Liberals, and Antirenters. Id. at 13.  Added to this
list are, among others, the more recent Independence, Conservative, Reform, Lib-
ertarian, Right to Life, Green, and Working Families Parties.
2. The most frequently cited reason for the two-party system is the “winner
take all” nature of the American electoral system (as opposed to a representative
system in which that percentage of voters who agreed with a certain party would
translate into that percentage of representation by that party in government),
which makes it especially difficult for a new, smaller party trying to build up sup-
port. See id. at 9.  The tendency of two parties to emerge as dominant in a system
that elects presidents and governors by a statewide plurality method, and which
elects national and state legislators by a single member district plurality method,
is referred to as “Duverger’s Law.”  Howard A. Scarrow, Duverger’s Law, Fusion,
and the Decline of American “Third” Parties, 39 W. POL. Q. 634, 634 (1986). Other
reasons include the fact that the major parties represent a wide variety of voters
from all economic and political spectrums who are held together by their willing-
ness to compromise on issues, and the fact that even if elected, it is difficult for a
third party to gain a foothold since power in Congress and the state legislatures is
divided up by party membership totals.
765
1
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-4\PLR405.txt unknown Seq: 2 28-OCT-09 13:20
766 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:765
spite this two-party system, third parties have influenced the
dialogue of the two major parties significantly.3  In rare cases,
they have even successfully displaced a major party.4  Eventu-
ally, however, and with few exceptions, third parties in America
have come and gone; the state of equilibrium has consistently
been that of two parties, which ultimately become more domi-
nant by picking up the support of the various and fledgling
third parties after or before their demise.5
One way in which third parties have maintained their vi-
tality throughout history is through cross-endorsement, also
known as fusion.  Cross-endorsement is the process by which
one political party endorses another party’s candidate for the
same office in the same election.6  Votes on both (or in some
cases three or four) lines are added together to get the total
votes cast for that particular candidate.7  Examples abound in
which the addition of the minor party line has seemingly meant
the difference between victory and defeat for the candidate.  In
the 1980 presidential election, the Conservative Party line pro-
vided the deciding votes for Ronald Reagan in New York;8 the
Liberal Party did the same for John Kennedy, enabling him to
3. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185
(1979) (noting the “significant role that third parties have played in the political
development of the Nation”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957)
(“History has amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident
groups, who innumerable times have been in the vanguard of democratic thought
and whose programs were ultimately accepted.”).
4. This was much more a possibility in the nineteenth century, when the
country was still feeling its way in terms of political parties.  A third party simply
became the new “major” party, as when the Republican Party replaced the Whigs.
See HESSELTINE, supra note 1, at 11-12; JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE
PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 92 (rev. ed. 1983).
5. For example, the Populist Party, which was formed in the late nineteenth
century, impacted policy greatly, but was ultimately absorbed by the Democratic
Party, which by then, was firmly entrenched as one of the two major parties. See
SUNDQUIST, supra note 4, at 152-54.
6. See, e.g., William R. Kirschner, Note, Fusion and the Associational Rights
of Minor Political Parties, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 683, 683 (1995).
7. Generally, the candidate’s name appears separately on the different lines.
This is called “disaggregation.” See Note, Fusion Candidacies, Disaggregation,
and Freedom of Association, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1302, 1309 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Marc Humbert, Bush May Not Get Conservative Line, ALBANY
TIMES UNION, June 5, 1992, at A7 (noting that “the Reagan-Bush ticket collected
more than 256,000 New York votes on the Conservative line, enough to hand them
the state” in the 1980 Presidential election).
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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defeat Richard Nixon in the 1960 election.9  Rudy Giuliani may
not have prevailed over David Dinkins in the 1992 New York
City mayoral race without the support of the Liberal Party.10
Similarly, without the 328,605 votes received from the Con-
servative Party line, George Pataki may not have been victori-
ous over Mario Cuomo in the 1994 New York State
gubernatorial race.11  Notably, the above examples all involve
New York, which is often hailed as the epitome of a state that
has healthy and competitive third parties.  The reasons for this
are twofold: first, New York is one of only seven states which
currently allow cross-endorsement;12 second, among the seven,
cross-endorsement is utilized most frequently in New York be-
cause of the large number of voters who are unaffiliated with
any party13 and thus, more likely to vote on a minor party line.
Does this ability to cross-endorse candidates really create a
meaningful system of third parties?  More specifically, does
New York really have strong third parties?
This Note contends that cross-endorsement does not lead to
strong third parties and that in New York’s case, the tendency
of third parties to use cross-endorsement almost exclusively (as
opposed to choosing their own candidates) is inimical to their
9. See, e.g., Warren Weaver, Jr., Liberal Aid Here Won for Kennedy, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1960, at 22 (noting that without the Liberal Party’s 406,167 votes
for Kennedy, he may not have won New York State).
10. See Kirschner, supra note 6, at 683 (citing BD. OF ELECTIONS IN THE CITY
OF N.Y., STATEMENT AND RETURN OF THE VOTES FOR THE OFFICE OF MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y. 1 (1993)).
11. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, VOTE CAST FOR GOVERNOR AND LIEUTENANT
GOVERNOR BY PARTY OF CANDIDATES, NEW YORK STATE BY COUNTY – NOVEMBER 8,
1994, at 1 (1994), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/elections/
1994/gov94.pdf.
12. New York allows cross-endorsement pursuant to N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-120,
6-146 (McKinney 2007).  The other states which allow cross-endorsement are Con-
necticut, Delaware, Mississippi, Idaho, South Carolina, and Vermont. See ADAM
MORSE & J.J. GASS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, MORE CHOICES, MORE VOICES: A
PRIMER ON FUSION 1 (2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/
download_file_39345.pdf.
13. The number of unaffiliated voters in New York is 20% of the total number
of voters (compared to 49% and 25% for Democratic and Republican enrollment,
respectively). See N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, NYS VOTER ENROLLMENT BY
COUNTY, PARTY AFFILIATION AND STATUS, at 8 (2009), available at http://www.elec-
tions.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/county_apr09.pdf.  The choices the
unaffiliated voters make can determine the outcome in many areas of the state and
in the state as a whole.
3
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often stated goals of advancing diverse beliefs and offering dis-
tinct programmatic agendas and significant electoral
competition.
Part I identifies what advocates of cross-endorsement see
as its benefits.  Part II tracks the historical background of cross-
endorsement and the factors that led most states to ban the
practice.  Part III briefly examines the judicial evolution of the
rights of minor third parties.  This section will also discuss the
Supreme Court’s ruling on the constitutionality of cross-en-
dorsement bans in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.14
Finally, Part IV will assess the effect that cross-endorsement
has had on politics in New York and will seek to show that third
parties in the State, because of their dependence on cross-en-
dorsement, function more as addenda to the major parties than
as independent alternatives.  The Note concludes by suggesting
that if the New York Legislature were to join the majority of
other states in the nation and enact a fusion ban, it would be
harsh medicine initially, but would ultimately encourage the
major parties to focus on their core ideals and would encourage
third parties to act as true vehicles of choice by cultivating their
own candidates and offering voters genuine alternatives.
I. Benefits of Fusion for Major and Minor Parties
For a major party facing strong opposition, fusing with a
minor party candidate offers an increased chance of winning
elections through the addition of votes accumulated under a dif-
ferent banner.  For the minor party, the ability to cross-endorse
a major party candidate allows it not only to be involved in the
election, but to play a significant role.  Cross-endorsement en-
ables minor party voters to vote for a winner on the line that
best represents their own views, as opposed to throwing their
votes away on their own separate candidate with no realistic
hope of winning.  The goal is that the fusion candidate, once
elected, and other elected officials, will recognize that a portion
of the candidate’s votes came from the minor party group and
will respond to its issues accordingly.15  Cross-endorsement also
14. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
15. For example, in 2001, Bill Lindsay, a Democratic candidate for County
Legislature in Suffolk County, New York, was endorsed by the Working Families
Party (“WFP”).  Working Families Party, How Fusion Build [sic] Progressive
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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overcomes the problem of “spoiling” the election, which can oc-
cur when voters split their votes between two similar candi-
dates, ultimately helping to elect their third, least favorite
candidate.  Cross-endorsing candidates is beneficial for policy
reasons as well, proponents say, since putting viable candidates
on different lines increases public participation in the voting
process.16  Most important perhaps, advocates of cross-endorse-
ment point out that a political party has a guarantee of the free-
dom of association under the First Amendment to identify those
people who constitute the association and to select the standard
bearer who best represents that party’s ideologies and
preferences.17
II. Historical Background of Cross-Endorsement
In the nineteenth century, cross-endorsement was widely
practiced in the United States.18  This is not necessarily because
the electorate made a conscious decision that it was proper and
good; it was because the process by which votes were cast in
elections had encouraged it.  Until the Australian, or secret-bal-
lot system, was introduced at the turn of the century, election
ballots were controlled by the parties themselves, without over-
sight by election officials or even the candidates.19  Each party
printed and distributed its own ballot or ballots and voters
Power for Working People, http://www.workingfamiliesparty.org/2008/09/how-fu-
sion-build-progressive-power-for-working-people/ (Sept. 27, 2008).  His margin of
victory was slim, but it coincided with the number of votes recorded on the Work-
ing Families line. Id. Subsequently, a WFP bill supporting the “living wage”
passed in the Republican-controlled County Legislature in Suffolk County, a first
in the country. Id.  See SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., Local Law No. 12-2001 (codified as
amended at ch. 234, art. I, § 234-7 (2009)).  The feeling was that the Republicans
who had been blocking the living wage bill had noticed the WFP’s role in the Lind-
say victory and had changed course. See Working Families Party, supra.
16. It can be argued that those people who vote on the minor party line may
have voted anyway.  At any rate, this is an extremely difficult matter to prove
because of the many variables that contribute to voter turnout or lack thereof. See
Brief for Twelve University Professors and Center of a New Democracy as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12 n.1, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
520 U.S. 351 (1997) (No. 95-1608), 1996 WL 496827, at *12 n.1 (acknowledging
that New York’s electoral turnout had “slipped to echo the national average” de-
spite the fact that fusion candidacies are permitted).
17. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 374-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. Peter H. Argersinger, “A Place on the Ballot”: Fusion Politics and Antifu-
sion Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287, 288 (1980).
19. Id. at 290.
5
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would have no idea if they were voting for a candidate who also
appeared as another party’s choice, since they were only looking
at their own “ballot strip.”20  Indeed, even a candidate who was
unwilling to fuse with another party could find himself on that
party’s ballot.21  The system was neither efficient nor private.
Newspapers routinely included warnings in the days prior to
the elections about “bogus” ballots—ballots that looked like the
“party” ballot, but which had the names of candidates from a
different party—being given to unsuspecting and inattentive
voters.22  Moreover, since different parties’ ballots had unique
colors and sizes and there was no booth for privacy, others could
tell right away which party a voter was voting for simply by
looking at the ballot in his hand.23  Party members standing
near polling places, peddling their candidates and pressuring
voters, contributed to a system of party control of election bal-
lots, which led to intimidation, bribery and ballot stuffing.24
The introduction of the Australian ballot was a reform-
minded change, but it hurt third-party proliferation in a num-
ber of ways.25  First, along with the Australian ballot came the
first ballot-access laws, which required minor parties to submit
nominating petitions signed by a certain percentage of the elec-
torate.26  These laws were supposedly passed to keep the bal-
lots shorter27 and were legitimized by the common belief
in the Founding Father’s caution about the dangers of factional-
20. Id. The ballots were strips of paper that contained only the names of the
candidates of that party. Id.  The voter placed his ballot in the ballot box in some
cases, without even marking it. Id.
21. Id.
22. John F. Reynolds & Richard L. McCormick, Outlawing “Treachery”: Split
Tickets and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910, 72 J. AM. HIST.
835, 846 (1986).
23. Elissa Berger, Note, A Party That Won’t Spoil: Minor Parties, State Con-
stitutions and Fusion Voting, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1387-88 (2005).
24. ELDON COBB EVANS, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES 10-14 (1969).
25. Scarrow, supra note 2, at 637-38.
26. Id.  The major parties did not have to overcome this obstacle since they
would attain automatic ballot access due to the large number of votes received on
their line in the previous election. Id. at 638.
27. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, ROY L. BEHR & EDWARD H. LAZARUS, THIRD PAR-
TIES IN AMERICA 20 (2d ed. 1996); James Gray Pope, Fusion, Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, and the Future of Third Parties in the United States, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 473, 484 (1998).
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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ism.28  The Australian ballot also exposed the plethora of cross-
endorsements between parties because all candidates were now
on one “blanket” ballot, generally listed separately under each
party whose endorsement they had received.29  In present
times, this is seen as an advantage because it allows a voter to
pick her candidate on the party line she prefers.  However, at
the turn of the century, when such a ballot was new in the
states, the legislatures, mostly dominated by Republicans,
passed laws prohibiting a candidate’s name from being listed
more than once, again purportedly to keep the ballots shorter
and more decipherable.30  Depending on the type of ballot which
was being used, these restrictions became a de facto ban on
cross-endorsement between parties.31  The rationale that al-
lowing a candidate to list his name only once would lead to equi-
table elections and a more efficient ballot32 was seen as
“eminently fair”33 in states which used the “Massachusetts bal-
lot”34—one in which a candidate’s name was placed under a col-
umn heading for the office sought, followed by whichever party
endorsements he had received.35  However, in states which had
the “party column” form of ballot—where the names of all the
candidates of each party were grouped vertically under the
party name, not the office sought—this necessarily prevented
fusion.36  The confusion that ensued at the time led one Republi-
can editor to declare the situation to be a “very pretty jungle.”37
Whatever the reason, the requirement that a candidate’s
name appear only once on the ballot either forced the parties
that were planning to fuse to nominate separate candidates,
thereby accumulating fewer votes each, or it forced the two par-
28. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10
(James Madison).
29. Argersinger, supra note 18, at 291.
30. See Arthur C. Ludington, American Ballot Law, 1888-1910, EDUC. DEP’T
BULL., Feb. 1, 1911, at 12-83 for a detailed account of the anti-fusion laws enacted
by Republican legislatures in the 1890s.
31. Arthur Ludington, Present Status of Ballot Laws in the United States, 3
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 252, 258-59 (1909).
32. Argersinger, supra note 18, at 292.
33. Ludington, supra note 31, at 258.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 258-59.
37. Argersinger, supra note 18, at 293 (quoting PORTLAND MORNING OREGO-
NIAN, Oct. 27, 28, & 30, 1892).
7
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ties to battle it out as to which line would have the name of the
candidate.38  This kept certain voters from voting for the fusion
candidate due to partisan feelings (i.e., if two parties nominated
a candidate and his name only appeared under one party’s
name, the other party’s voters would sometimes withhold their
votes).39  Finally, the lines could be combined (i.e., the candidate
could run on, for instance, the Democratic-Populist ticket), but
this too could engender partisan feelings and would not yield
the same number of votes as if the candidate’s name appeared
on separate lines.40
An example from the 1892 election illustrates the political
advantage that was taken away from fusion candidacies in
states which banned fusion.  In that election, the Democrats
were seeking the Populist vote in order to increase the electoral
votes for their candidate, Grover Cleveland.41  Democratic Party
leaders in Oregon thus withdrew one of their four nominees for
the Electoral College and replaced him with a Populist candi-
date, Nathan Pierce, who became a fusion candidate and who
would presumably receive the votes of both Populists and Dem-
ocrats.42  In the meantime, however, the Oregon legislature,
controlled by the Republicans, had passed an anti-fusion law,
prohibiting the name of any candidate from appearing more
than once on a ballot.43  This meant that Pierce’s name had to
be listed as either a Populist or at best a Populist-Democrat,
something the Republicans knew would be distasteful to both
straight Populists and those with Populist-Republican leanings.
The conflict arose so late in the campaign that, in the end, Dem-
ocratic county clerks printed the ballot one way, with Pierce’s
38. Id. at 291-92.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 293.  In Ohio’s 1877 gubernatorial election, the idea of a combined
Greenbacker-Democratic ticket was anathema to most Greenbackers, leading one
to state that “men would as soon cut off their right hands almost as vote a Demo-
cratic ticket.”  R.C. McGrane, Ohio and the Greenback Movement, 11 MISS. VALLEY
HIST. REV. 526, 535 (1925) (quoting CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 22, 1877).  In the
1879 election, the possibility of fusing with the Democrats again led to great dis-
sension within the party, with banners displayed at their convention declaring,
“Traitors and office seekers favor coalition,” “Honest men are true to their princi-
ples,” and “Coalition means disorganization.” Id. at 540.
41. Argersinger, supra note 18, at 292.
42. Id. at 293.
43. Id. at 297 n.25 (noting that the Oregon law was passed without apparent
recognition of its significance).
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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name appearing separately under both the Populist and Demo-
cratic groupings and Republican county clerks printed it an-
other, with Pierce’s name appearing once, with the Populist
nominees (although giving him both party designations).44  In
those counties in which Pierce’s name was listed separately
under Democratic and Populist groupings, virtually 100% of
Populists voted for him and 92% of Democrats did the same.  In
those counties in which Pierce’s name was listed only under the
Populist banner, but with a Democratic designation as well, he
received 91% of the Populist vote and 81% of the Democratic
votes.45  Without their own line, it seems, certain party loyalists
were unwilling to vote for a candidate, even if their party had
endorsed that candidate.  This example allows for a rare calcu-
lation of the value of separate cross-endorsement listings, in
terms of the number of votes it adds: with separate listings, the
candidate received 9% more of the Populist vote and 11% more
of the Democratic vote.
Notwithstanding possible political motives on the part of
the Republicans, by the early 1900s, at least twenty-five state
legislatures banned fusion.46  In addition to straight bans, some
states, notably Wyoming, added amendments requiring that the
names of political parties not exceed one word, thereby prevent-
ing new fusion parties with double names.47  In North Dakota,
instead of adding such an amendment, the Republican Secre-
tary of State declared that candidates of the new Independent-
Democratic Party could not appear on the ballot in 1897 be-
cause the party had not received the necessary amount of
votes—five percent—in the last election, even though they had
not existed in the last election and therefore could not have pos-
sibly received any votes.48  Subsequently, he did not allow the
candidates to appear on either the Independent or the Demo-
cratic lines.49  He ruled that when they had formed the new In-
dependent-Democratic party, their individual parties had
44. Id. at 293-94.
45. Id. at 294.
46. Scarrow, supra note 2, at 639.
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ceased to exist and they could not therefore regain a spot on the
ballot.50
A. Early Challenges to Anti-Fusion Laws in State Courts
State courts, in deflecting some of the early challenges to
the anti-fusion laws, utilized some of the same legal reasoning
that was to come later on the Supreme Court level, such as the
idea that anti-fusion laws do not hinder the “exercise of the
right of suffrage”51 since “when the voter goes to the quietude of
his booth to vote, he has the absolute and unqualified right to
vote for whom he pleases.”52  In State ex rel. Runge v. Anderson,
City Clerk, a Wisconsin candidate who had received two en-
dorsements was able only to appear on one line because of the
state’s anti-fusion statute.53  The court responded negatively to
his challenge to the law, saying, “We are unable to see anything
in the present ballot law which passes beyond the bounds of
reasonable regulation in view of the end sought - the right of all
to vote in secrecy and upon the basis of political equality and
purity.”54  The court pointed out that a system with no barrier
to securing representation on the ballot would result in a ballot
of limitless size, complication and confusion, creating in some
circumstances a right to vote that was so burdensome that
“many would not feel able to bear it, and others would not care
to do so.”55  Moreover, while agreeing that the right of the indi-
vidual to vote for his candidate on a particular party line was
impacted negatively by the law, the court stated that the indi-
vidual could still vote for his candidate and it is that right, after
all, which is protected.  “Mere party fealty and party sentiment,
which influences men to desire to be known as members of a
particular organization, are not the subjects of constitutional
care,” the court asserted.56  Finally, candidates should stand for
the principles of the party that is nominating them, the court
said.57  When more than one party nominates a candidate, it
50. Id.
51. State ex rel. Dunn v. Coburn, 168 S.W. 956, 959 (Mo. 1914).
52. Id.
53. 76 N.W. 482, 483 (Wis. 1898).
54. Id. at 486.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 487.
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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must be that at that time, the parties stand for the same plat-
form of ideas.  It should not be an issue, therefore, to have only
one designation on the ballot.58  The court concluded that “[t]he
confusion and uncertainty that would arise . . . from the double
printing of names, furnishes a strong reason for prohibiting
it.”59  Other early courts took a different tact, expressing moral
outrage at the underlying motives of fusion candidacies:
To my mind there is no scheme so fraught with danger
of fraud, deceit, dishonesty, corruption, and all similar
attendant ills than what is known as the political fu-
sion. It is fraudulent, because fraud is practiced upon
the unsuspecting voter by a few political leaders.  It is
deceitful, because when a candidate of one political
faith permits his name to be placed on a ticket under a
caption indicating a different political faith, deceit is
tolerated and practiced.  True it is that the leaders in
politics may know that he is not of the political faith
indicated by the ticket upon which he permits his
name to go, yet the unsuspecting masses are deceived.
This is common knowledge.60
In pointing out that the anti-fusion law in question was passed
to maintain the purity of elections, another court stated:
Certain evil practices had grown up by reason of plac-
ing the name of a candidate upon the same ballot more
than once, and the general assembly attempted to pre-
vent such practice by providing that the name of each
candidate should appear on the ballot but once. . . .
The subject is clearly within legislative discretion, and
that body has the power to provide that the name of
each candidate shall appear but once upon the official




60. State ex rel. Dunn v. Coburn, 168 S.W. 956, 957-58 (Mo. 1914).
61. State ex rel. Bateman v. Bode, 45 N.E. 195, 196-97 (Ohio 1896).
11
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III. Modern Jurisprudence Regarding Rights of Minor
Political Parties
A. Evolution of the Rights of Minor Political Parties
The Elections Clause of the United States Constitution
grants to the state legislatures the power to regulate the time,
place and manner of elections.62  The state legislatures exercise
this power, in part, by restricting the candidates who may ap-
pear on their ballots.  Generally, for a new party to gain access
to the ballot, it must submit nominating petitions.63  This is un-
like the major or established third parties, which are automati-
cally entitled to a line on the ballot if they poll the requisite
number of votes on their line in the previous election.64  The
states regulate the petition process by delineating how many
signatures are required, who can sign, who can circulate the pe-
titions and when they can circulate.65
In the seminal case of Williams v. Rhodes,66 the Court
struck down a group of laws which, among many other hur-
dles,67 required that political parties, in order to gain a place on
the Ohio general election ballot, obtain fifteen percent of quali-
fied voters’ signatures and file by an excessively early dead-
line.68  In contrast, those parties that already had a place on the
ballot had a lesser burden, since to stay on the ballot, they were
required only to receive ten percent of the vote in the previous
gubernatorial election and were not required to obtain any sig-
natures.69  The Court assessed the totality of the restrictive
Ohio election laws and concluded that:
Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at
the core of our electoral process and of the First
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
63. Amber J. Juffer, Note, Living in a Party World: Respecting the Role of
Third Party and Independent Candidates in the Equal Protection Analysis of Bal-
lot Access Cases, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 217, 220-21 (2007).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 221.
66. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
67. See id. at 36-37.
68. Specifically, the law required the party to obtain fifteen percent of the
number of ballots cast in the last gubernatorial election. Id. at 24-25.  At the time,
forty-two states required third parties to obtain signatures of only one percent or
less of the electorate in order to gain a place on the ballot. Id. at 33 n.9.
69. Id. at 25-26.
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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Amendment freedoms.  New parties struggling for
their place must have the time and opportunity to or-
ganize in order to meet reasonable requirements for
ballot position, just as the old parties have had in the
past.70
The Ohio laws made it “virtually impossible” for other par-
ties, new or old, to achieve a position on the ballot.71  Basing its
decision on the Equal Protection Clause, the Court declared
that the burden on voting and associational rights constituted
“invidious discrimination.”72  The Court employed a strict scru-
tiny analysis in their strongly worded decision, but it is impor-
tant to note that the ballot-access laws at issue were quite
extreme.  The freedom of association protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments does include partisan political organi-
zations,73 but certain state-imposed restrictions or require-
ments are perfectly acceptable to the Court when they are
reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and when there are valid gov-
ernmental interests to be protected.74  If the courts do not deem
the offending laws as “operat[ing] to freeze the political status
quo,”75 their scrutiny will be less stringent than if it is clear that
the objective of the laws is to “suffocate the right of association,
the promotion of political ideas and programs of political
action.”76
B. The Constitutionality of Fusion Bans
Unlike overly burdensome signature requirements or ex-
cessively early deadlines for submission of petitions, when a fu-
70. Id. at 32.
71. Id. at 24.
72. Id. at 34.
73. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986).
74. See, e.g., Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (where state law
required nominating petition with signatures of five percent of the electorate,
“[t]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary show-
ing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political or-
ganization’s candidate on the ballot – the interest, if no other, in avoiding
confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general
election”).
75. Id. at 438.
76. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 39 (1968).
13
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sion candidacy is denied77 due to a fusion ban, the candidate is
not denied access to the ballot.  The candidate, however, is de-
nied more than one line on the ballot.  It was the denial of this
second line that caused the New Party of Minnesota to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of Minnesota’s fusion ban in 1994.
The effort culminated in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party.78  The Court found that the burdens imposed by Minne-
sota’s anti-fusion laws on a party’s associational rights were
justified by the state interests of ballot integrity and political
stability.79  In addition, the Court stated that the minor party’s
right to associate still exists under the anti-fusion law because
members may still vote for the candidate of their choice.80  An
analysis of the facts and procedural history of the case deline-
ates the arguments on both sides of the fusion debate as it
played out in the 1990s.
Minnesota State Representative Andy Dawkins was run-
ning unopposed in the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor
(“DFL”) Party’s81 primary in April 1994.  During the same
month, the New Party endorsed Dawkins as their candidate for
the same office in the general election to be held in November.
As expected, election officials in Minnesota refused to accept the
New Party’s nominating petition because fusion candidacies
were prohibited in Minnesota.82  The New Party filed suit in dis-
trict court, asserting that the Minnesota law violated the
party’s associational rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.83  The district court granted summary judgment
77. I.e., when election officials decline to accept nominating petitions for the
candidate’s placement on a second ballot line.
78. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
79. Id. at 369-70.
80. Id. at 369.
81. The DFL party started out as the Farmer-Labor party. See Timmons, 520
U.S. at 361 n.9.  It elected many of its own candidates without fusing with a major
party. Id. It ultimately declined in importance and merged with a major party—
the Democratic Party—a common path for even the most successful third parties.
Id.
82. Minnesota’s law reads: “No individual who seeks nomination for any par-
tisan or nonpartisan office at a primary shall be nominated for the same office by
nominating petition.” MINN. STAT. § 204B.04 (2008).  The New Party used the
Dawkins nomination as a test case in order to have fusion bans ruled unconstitu-
tional, once and for all. See Pope, supra note 27, at 474-75.
83. Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 863 F. Supp. 988 (D. Minn.
1994).
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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for the election-official defendants, stating that it did not see
the case as one denying the New Party access to the ballot,
which would have called for strict scrutiny review of the chal-
lenged law.84  Rather, it saw the case as one in which the New
Party was not willing to find a candidate who had not already
been nominated by another party.85  Furthermore, the court
stated that issues such as choosing candidates are largely “mat-
ters of policy best left to the deliberative bodies themselves.”86
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
lower court, causing a circuit split.87  The court stated that the
ban burdened the New Party’s right to select a standard bearer
and its right to broaden the base of participation in its activities
because it forced its members to “either cast their votes for can-
didates with no realistic chance of winning, defect from their
party and vote for a major party candidate who does, or decline
to vote at all.”88  The court also found that the ban was broader
than necessary for the state’s goals of maintaining party har-
mony (simple ballot instructions could cure major party
splintering, the court said), voter clarity, and a stable political
system.89
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding
that fusion bans do not violate the First or Fourteenth Amend-
ments.90  The Court weighed the burden of the law on those it
affects against the interests the state has to justify the bur-
den.91  While the New Party was entitled to select its own candi-
date, the Court stated that just because “a particular individual
may not appear on the ballot as a particular party’s candidate
does not severely burden that party’s associational rights.”92
The ban did not stop the New Party from endorsing the candi-
84. Id. at 994.  The court stated that even if the statute was reviewed under
stricter scrutiny, it would still “pass muster.” Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196 (8th Cir. 1996). See
also Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1991) (anti-fusion law did not bur-
den associational rights of third party and even if it did, the state’s interests justi-
fied the burden).
88. Twin Cities, 73 F.3d at 199.
89. Id.
90. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 370-71 (1997).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 359.
15
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date, even though he could not appear on the ballot under its
name.93  The party was therefore able to associate freely for the
advancement of its shared goals, and its members were also free
to vote for whomever they wished, including Dawkins.94  The
Court, noting the New Party’s argument that without fusion,
third parties cannot thrive, stated that just because fusion may
be beneficial does not mean that Minnesota must permit it.95
Notable is the difference between the attitude of the Court,
which specifically declined to judge the policy behind the fusion
ban, and that of the court in Anderson, which seemed to indi-
cate its approval of the ban.
The New Party also argued that the Minnesota ban shut off
the possibility of sending a message to a candidate “because,
with fusion, a candidate who wins an election on the basis of
two parties’ votes will likely know more—if the parties’ votes
are counted separately—about the particular wishes and ideals
of his constituency.”96  The Court responded that the party has
no right to use the ballot in this way and that “[b]allots serve
primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expres-
sion.”97  In fact, using the ballot as a forum for political expres-
sion, the Court noted, was a way of exploiting fusion:
[M]embers of a major party could decide that a power-
ful way of “sending a message” via the ballot would be
for various factions of that party to nominate the ma-
jor party’s candidate as the candidate for the newly-
formed “No New Taxes,” “Conserve Our Environ-
ment,” and “Stop Crime Now” parties.  In response, an
opposing major party would likely instruct its factions
to nominate that party’s candidate as the “Fiscal Re-
sponsibility,” “Healthy Planet,” and “Safe Streets” par-
ties’ candidate.98
93. Id. at 360.
94. See id. at 361 (“The New Party remains free to endorse whom it likes, to
ally itself with others, to nominate candidates for office, and to spread its message
to all who will listen.”).
95. Id. at 362.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 363. See also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992) (“[T]he
State is within its rights to reserve ‘[t]he general election ballot . . . for major strug-
gles . . . [and] not a forum for continuing intraparty feuds.’” (quoting Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974))).
98. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 365.
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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Such political manipulation undermines the ballot by
“transforming it from a means of choosing candidates to a bill-
board for political advertising.”99
The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’s conclusion
that a ban on cross-endorsements needed to be narrowly tai-
lored to serve compelling state interests.100  The burden the ban
imposed was not trivial, the Court said, but it was not severe
enough to warrant such strict scrutiny.101  The state interests of
avoiding voter confusion and overcrowded ballots justified the
ban.102  Ultimately, the Court stated that it was not expressing
any policy-based views regarding fusion in general; it was
merely stating that the Constitution does not require any state
to permit it.103
C. Fusion: Savior or Destroyer of Third Parties?
Perhaps because cross-endorsement is now permitted in so
few states, the harsh language employed by the early courts re-
garding the ills of having a candidate’s name on two party lines
has virtually disappeared.  Instead, many present-day commen-
tators assign responsibility for the “decline” of third parties to
the fusion bans throughout the country.104  However, the bur-
den of petition requirements and other ballot-access laws which
impose, for example, unrealistic filing deadlines and fees for mi-
nor third parties overshadows any inability to appear more
than once on a ballot.105  Third-party candidates must use a
much higher proportion of their resources to obtain ballot access
than major party candidates and when they do “manage to cir-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 363-64.
102. Id. at 369-70.
103. Id. at 370.
104. E.g., Argersinger, supra note 18; Scarrow, supra note 2; Berger, supra
note 23.
105. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (Ohio statute re-
quiring Independent candidate for President to file statement of candidacy and
nominating petition in March in order to appear on general election ballot in No-
vember placed unconstitutional burden on voting and associational rights of sup-
porters); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (Texas primary election filing fee
system, under which payment of filing fee was absolute prerequisite to the candi-
date’s participation in the primary election, and which did not provide for write-in
or other alternative means of obtaining a position on primary ballots, violated
equal protection).
17
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culate a petition and receive the required number of signatures,
those signatures can be challenged and the candidate will then
have to go through a court battle, which can be very costly, re-
gardless of the outcome.”106  It is no wonder that the most suc-
cessful third-party candidates are ones with the most private
wealth.107
Furthermore, referring to the “decline” of third parties pre-
supposes a strength that is less true in reality than in theory.
Even before fusion bans were imposed at the end of the nine-
teenth century, the motives behind those flourishing fusion can-
didacies were not always pure and the results were not always
positive for the third parties.
Fusion plans were generally undertaken . . . to pro-
mote the needs of the major party and were generally
initiated or avoided according to the calculations of its
politicians rather than those of the leaders of the eva-
nescent third parties.  Thus, the Republicans some-
times arranged fusions in the South but retreated
whenever their participation in such a campaign
might work against the Democratic divisiveness they
sought to exploit.108
Fusion candidacies generally involved passing alliances
and were only undertaken when party leaders saw a genuine
strategic advantage.109  The system led to strange coalitions,
with for example, the Greenback Party, in 1884, choosing to
fuse in each state with whichever party was in the minority.110
Fusion did bring about “quick results,” but it also “weakened
attachment of voters to a new political group that lacked tradi-
tion, organization, experience, newspapers, patronage, and fi-
nancial support.”111  This demonstration of political malleability
in the form of fusion ultimately led to the Greenback Party’s
demise.
106. Juffer, supra note 63, at 246.
107. For example, Ross Perot, who ran for President in 1996, spent $12 mil-
lion to just get on the ballot in every state. Id.
108. Argersinger, supra note 18, at 288.
109. Id.
110. Id. See also SUNDQUIST, supra note 4, at 114-115.
111. SUNDQUIST, supra note 4, at 114.
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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IV. Cross-Endorsement in New York
A. Early Efforts to Ban Cross-Endorsement
Fusion has always had a place in New York,112 despite a
few early efforts to ban it.  The first law banning cross-endorse-
ment passed in 1896113 but was overturned in In re Callahan114
as an unconstitutional and arbitrary exclusion from candidacy
for office.115  In 1908, another anti-fusion law, which passed in
both houses, was vetoed by Governor Hughes.116  “[A]s long as
we retain the present form of ballot with its party columns, it
would be a grave injustice to prohibit a candidate’s name from
appearing in more than one column,” he said, adding that the
state should “abolish the party column” type of ballot.117  Other
laws were enacted in 1911118 and 1931,119 but both were de-
clared unconstitutional.120  The only lasting limitation to fusion
112. The first fusion gubernatorial election was held in New York in 1854, in
which the major party Whig candidate was supported in a fusion candidacy by
eleven other political parties, among them the “Strong-Minded Women” Party, the
“Anti-Rent” Party and the “Negro” Party.  Scarrow, supra note 2, at 635.
113. Law of May 27, 1896, ch. 909, § 66 (repealed 1911) (“[I]t shall not be law-
ful for any committee of such party . . . to fill vacancies, to nominate, or to substi-
tute the name of, a candidate of another party . . . .”). See also Note, The
Constitutionality of Anti-Fusion and Party-Raiding Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
1207, 1211 n.30 (1947).
114. 93 N.E. 262 (N.Y. 1910).
115. See id. at 262-63.
116. Ludington, supra note 31, at 259.
117. Id.
118. 1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 891, § 58 (repealed 1911) (“The name of the candi-
date shall not appear more than once on the ballot as a candidate for the same
public office or party position.”).
119. Law of 1930, ch. 17, § 249 (as amended by 1931 N.Y. Laws ch. 270) (re-
pealed 1931) (“When a person has been nominated for an office by one political
party and has also been nominated for that office by one or more independent bod-
ies, unless said independent body or bodies shall have nominated candidates for
more than fifty per cent of the offices to be filled, his name shall appear only in the
row or column containing generally the names of candidates for other offices nomi-
nated by such party, and the name and emblem of such party and of each of such
independent bodies shall appear in connection with his name.”).
120. The 1911 law, overturned by the New York Court of Appeals in Hopper v.
Britt, 96 N.E. 371 (N.Y. 1911) did not ban fusion per se, but allowed a candidate’s
name to appear only once on the ballot, on the line of the party which appeared
first on the ballot. Hopper, 96 N.E. at 372.  If a second (smaller) party cross-en-
dorsed a candidate, his name would not appear in that party’s column. Id.  In-
stead, the ballot would direct the voter to the column of the first party with the
words “See Column,” followed by a blank space to fill in. Id.  The court stated that
“[t]he change from the old system [did] not diminish the size of the ballot, nor [did]
19
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candidacies in New York came in 1947 with the passage of the
so-called Wilson-Pakula law,121 which prevents a member of one
party from running for the nomination of another party without
the approval of the second party.122  Section 6-120 of the New
York Election Law provides that except in New York City, “[t]he
members of the party committee representing the political sub-
division of the office for which a designation or nomination is to
be made . . . may, by a majority vote . . . authorize the designa-
tion or nomination of a person as candidate for any office who is
not enrolled as a member of such party as provided in this sec-
tion.”123  In the litigation that followed the enactment of “Wil-
son-Pakula,” and which contested its validity, the statute
prevailed.124  The courts were convinced that the statute was
not arbitrary and unreasonable because of the state’s interests
in protecting the integrity of political parties, as well as in
preventing party-raiding, whereby a candidate, not in sympa-
thy with the principles of the party, would run on that party’s
line so as to capture and control it.125
it decrease the printing on it[,] . . .  [nor did it] tend to make voting easier for the
elector, or [ ] avoid confusion on his part . . . .” Id. at 374.  On the contrary, the law
unnecessarily discriminated against certain voters. Id. at 373.  The Court of Ap-
peals, in Crane v. Voorhis, 178 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1931) overturned the 1931 law.  In
that case, space was left blank for a nominee for district attorney, and the emblem
of the cross-endorsing party was placed next to the nominee’s name on the line of
the other (major) party which had nominated him. Crane, 178 N.E. at 169.  In
invalidating the law, the court said, “All voters within reasonable regulation must
have the same opportunity or else they are disenfranchised within the spirit and
meaning of the Constitution.” Id. at 170-71. See also Note, supra note 113, at
1211-12 (discussing the invalidation of both laws).
121. So named for its authors, State Senators Malcolm Wilson and Irwin
Pakula.  Martin v. Alverez, No. 05-15985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 19, 2005) (order
granting petition to invalidate designating petitions of town council candidates),
available at http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/fcas/fcas_docs/2005aug/5100159852
0051sciv.pdf.  See id. for a discussion of the legislative history and intent of the
Wilson-Pakula Law, now Election Law § 6-120(3).
122. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-120(3) (McKinney 2007). See Ingersoll v. Curran, 74
N.E.2d 465, 465 (N.Y. 1947) (upholding the constitutionality of the Wilson-Pakula
Act).
123. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-120(3).
124. See Werbel v. Gernstein, 78 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff’d, 78
N.Y.2d 926 (App. Div. 1948); Ingersoll v. Curran, 70 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. 1947),
aff’d, 74 N.E.2d 465 (N.Y. 1947); Ingersoll v. Heffernan, 71 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct.
1947), aff’d, 74 N.E.2d 466 (N.Y. 1947).
125. See, e.g., Curran, 70 N.Y.S.2d at 438-40 (noting that the State Legisla-
ture’s purpose in preventing political party raids is justifiable and does not contra-
vene the State’s Constitution).
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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B. Third Parties and the Use of Cross-Endorsement in New
York
New York election law defines the term “party” as “any po-
litical organization which at the last preceding election for gov-
ernor polled at least fifty thousand votes for its candidate for
governor.”126  Parties that earn 50,000 votes or more in an elec-
tion earn a place on the election ballot for the next four years,
with placement inversely proportional to number of votes re-
ceived (i.e., the first row on the ballot is held by the party which
received the most votes in the previous election cycle).127  Be-
cause of the places that the third parties in New York hold on
the ballot and the feverishness with which their endorsements
are sought by major party candidates, New York is often touted
as a state where fusion candidacies have led to hardy third par-
ties and more vigorous open debate on issues.128  But, is this
what is really occurring?  Or do the third parties simply piggy-
back on the major parties in order to maintain their spot on the
ballot and create patronage opportunities and other political
payback?  A look at the historically and current prominent third
parties in New York is instructive.
1. The Liberal Party
The Liberal Party, “an offshoot to the American Labor
Party,” reigned as an important and influential third party for
fifty-eight years.129  Its sudden downfall illustrates the false na-
ture of the strength that can come to a third party in New York
when it relies almost exclusively on cross-endorsement.  In each
of the fifteen presidential elections between 1944 and 2000, the
Liberal Party had a nominee on the ballot, but in fourteen of
those elections, the candidate was also the Democratic Party
126. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-104(3) (McKinney 2007).
127. Id. § 7-116(1).
128. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 23, at 1391 (“As a result [of fusion], minor
parties have thrived.”); Kirschner, supra note 6, at 684 (“The resulting exposure
and prestige [from the ability to cross-endorse candidates] has, in turn, helped
[third parties] to develop their organizations and improve the chances of their own
candidates.”). See also Brief for Twelve University Professors, supra note 16, at
12, 1996 WL 496827, at *12.
129. Robert J. Spitzer, Third Parties in New York, in GOVERNING NEW YORK
STATE 73, 75 (Robert F. Pecorella & Jeffrey M. Stonecash eds., 5th ed. 2006).  See
generally id. for a concise history of the American Labor Party.
21
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candidate.130  While the Party sometimes endorsed the Republi-
can candidate, it rarely, if ever, put forward its own candidate
for office, despite having the political machinery to do so.131  In
2002, the Liberal Party chose Andrew Cuomo, a Democrat, as
their gubernatorial candidate.132  When he dropped out of the
race just before the Democratic primary, the party lost any
chance of winning the 50,000 votes necessary to remain on the
ballot during the next four years.133   The post-mortem on the
Liberal Party, as reflected in a New York Times editorial, was
that it was always its plan to:
1) Cross-endorse the Democratic candidate for gover-
nor, thus earning at least 50,000 spillover votes from
New Yorkers who liked to think of themselves as very
liberal indeed.  2) Spend the next four years cross-en-
dorsing other candidates for everything from United
States senator to City Council member.  3) Collect pay-
ments from grateful officeholders in the form of pa-
tronage jobs and campaign contributions.134
2. The Conservative Party
The Conservative Party began because of dissatisfaction
with the Republican Party when it was dominated by Nelson
Rockefeller during the 1960s and 1970s.135  The Conservatives
wished to counter what they believed was a Republican Party
that had grown to be too liberal.136  In 1970, the Conservative
Party elected one of its own, James Buckley, to the U.S. Senate
130. See John E. Vargo, End of the Line for the New York Liberal Party?, LIB-
ERAL PARTY, www.liberalparty.org/vargoarticlep1.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2009).
131. The Liberal Party nominated Franklin Roosevelt, Jr. for governor in
1966, instead of cross-endorsing Democrat Frank O’Connor, who ultimately lost to
Republican Nelson Rockefeller. See Spitzer, supra note 129, at 82.  Mayor John
Lindsay, who was defeated in the Republican primary in 1969, received the Liberal
Party line in the general election and won, defeating both the Republican and
Democratic candidates. See id. at 81, 87.  Incumbent U.S. Senator Jacob Javits,
who lost the Republican primary to Alphonse D’Amato in 1980, was also given the
Liberal Party nomination. See id. at 82.  He ultimately lost to D’Amato. See id.
132. See id. at 84.
133. See Joyce Purnick, Liberal Party: Missteps Risk its Ballot Line, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at B1.
134. Editorial, An Election Day Ballot Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, §14
(WC), at 15.
135. See Spitzer, supra note 129, at 75-76.
136. See The Conservative Party of New York State, A Short History of the
Conservative Party (Jan. 5, 2008), http://www.cpnys.org/history/history.html.
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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in a three-way race;137 generally, however, the party has en-
dorsed major party candidates through cross-endorsement.138
Unlike the Liberal Party, whose views were seen as “flexible,”139
the Conservative Party has refused to compromise on issues im-
portant to it, often hurting the major party to which it most re-
lates, the Republican Party.  In the 2006 gubernatorial election,
for example, when the Republicans were choosing their candi-
date, the Conservative Party made it clear that they would not
support the front-runner, William Weld, because he supported
abortion rights and gay rights.140  Many thought that Weld had
a much better chance of defeating the Democratic candidate, El-
iot Spitzer, than did John Faso, a little-known pro-life Republi-
can State Assemblyman whom the Conservatives supported.141
Republican Party county leaders, however, worried about losing
the Conservative votes they traditionally counted on, endorsed
Faso at their respective conventions and thus, he received the
Republican nomination.142  In Faso’s case, it can be said that the
Conservative Party did function as a true third party—John
Faso was arguably their candidate whom the Republicans
agreed to run.  Although the Conservative Party’s insistence on
Faso virtually guaranteed that the Democratic Party would pre-
vail, the Conservatives nonetheless stuck to their principles.  Of
course, the Republican Party may still have lost the governor-
ship had they run the more well-known Weld.143  Regardless, in
this example, the significance of the third party was that it
forced the major party to get in line with its philosophy.
3. The Independence Party
The Independence Party has had a few incarnations.  Their
current place on the ballot in New York is due to the candidacy
137. See Spitzer, supra note 129, at 81-82.
138. See id. at 79-80.
139. Purnick, supra note 133.
140. Patrick Healy, In Weld’s Bid, G.O.P. Risks Losing Conservative Allies,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006, at B1.
141. Patrick Healy & Jennifer Medina, G.O.P. Hopes to Block Candidate as
Extreme, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at B1.
142. Patrick Healy, G.O.P. Supports Faso, Not Weld, for Governor, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2006, at A1.
143. After all, Spitzer received 66% of the total votes. See N.Y. STATE BD. OF
ELECTIONS, GOVERNOR ELECTION RETURNS NOV. 7, 2006, at 1 (2006), available at
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/elections/2006/general/2006_gov.pdf.
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of Tom Golisano, who ran for governor in 1994.144  Golisano
spent millions of his own money on the campaign,145 and the
result was enough votes on the Independence line to earn the
Party a place on the ballot in state elections.146  The Indepen-
dence Party stuck with Golisano, endorsing him in the next two
gubernatorial races.147  In 1998, Golisano received more votes
on his only line—the Independence line—than George Pataki
did on the Conservative line—his second line—which thus
bumped the Independence Party into the third position on the
ballot for the ensuing election.148
4. The Working Families Party
The Working Families Party was started in 1998 by a coali-
tion of labor and community groups who were looking to ad-
vance liberal issues and to stop what it perceived to be a
rightward shift on the part of the Democratic Party at the
time.149  It received its line on the ballot when it backed the
New York City Council speaker at the time, Peter Vallone, for
governor and received the requisite number of votes to warrant
a place on the ballot.150  The Working Families Party cross-en-
dorsed Eliot Spitzer in the 2006 New York gubernatorial elec-
144. Spitzer, supra note 129, at 76-77.
145. See David Firestone, Perot Backs Golisano as a Shaker-Up in His Own
Image, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at 52.
146. See N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 11, at 1 (showing
Golisano’s vote total of 217,490).
147. See N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, GOVERNOR ELECTION RETURNS NOV. 3,
1998, at 1 (1998), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/elections/
1998/GOVWEB.pdf (showing Golisano on the Independence line); N. Y. STATE BD.
OF ELECTIONS, GOVERNOR ELECTION RETURNS NOV. 5, 2002, at 1 (2002), available
at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/elections/2002/general/2002_gov.pdf
(same).
148. Golisano received 364,056 votes (Independence line) and Pataki received
348,727 (Conservative line). See N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, GOVERNOR ELEC-
TION RETURNS NOV. 3, 1998, supra note 147, at 1.
149. Abby Goodnough, Unions and Local Groups Join to Form a New Political
Party, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1998, at B6.
150. Id. See N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, GOVERNOR ELECTION RETURNS
NOV. 3, 1998, supra note 147, at 1 (identifying 51,325 votes received by Peter Val-
lone on the Working Families ballot line). See also Robert J. McCarthy, Crowded
State Election Ballot Adds 2 More Parties, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 14, 1998, at
B1.
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tion, earning more than 155,000 votes on their line and
ensuring a more prominent place on the ballot.151
Currently, the Independence, Conservative, and Working
Families parties are the three primary third parties in New
York and fusion is firmly rooted in their cultures.  Voter enroll-
ment statistics show that along with the 5.9 million registered
Democrats and the 2.9 million registered Republicans, there are
also 2.4 million unaffiliated voters, who, because they are not
registered with a party, are less predictable than the major
party registered voters in regard to their choices at the polls.152
It is those voters, in addition to the roughly 600,000 third-party
registered voters, that candidates must work to win over.  Ar-
guably, it is easier to do this by offering voters another party
line, which may downplay any aversion a voter may have to ei-
ther a “Democrat” or “Republican” label.  Depending on the
county, obtaining cross-endorsements from the minor political
parties is a part of the political process that cannot be ignored
by a candidate.  In fact, in certain counties in New York where
the enrollment numbers between the two major parties are
quite disparate, third-party endorsements can be the only
chance a candidate has.  For example, in Westchester County, a
Republican currently has a very difficult time getting elected
without a second or third minor-party cross-endorsement be-
cause the Democrats have nearly 125,000 more registered vot-
ers than the Republicans.153  As one political operative put it,
“Let’s face it – going in, you take every weapon you can get.”154
C. Cross-Endorsement in New York’s 2006 and 2008
Elections
The last two election cycles in New York State illustrate
that third parties rarely, if ever, run their own candidates.  In
151. See N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 143, at 1 (identifying
155,184 votes received by Eliot Spitzer on the Working Families ballot line).
152. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 13, at 8.
153. As of April 1, 2009, registered Democrats in Westchester County num-
bered 272,862 while Republicans numbered 149,272. Id.  There are 132,236 unaf-
filiated voters and 32,917 total third-party registered voters in this county,
including Independence, Conservative, Working Families, Green, Libertarian and
Socialist Workers. Id.
154. Julia C. Mead, Gauging the Swing Vote in Suffolk Races, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2003, at LI7 (quoting Michael Dawidziak, political strategist).
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2006, there were no non-fusion third-party candidates for gover-
nor,155 comptroller156 or attorney general.157  In addition, no
non-fusion third-party candidate ran for the United States Sen-
ate.158  The Independence and Working Families Parties cross-
endorsed candidates from the major parties in every House of
Representatives race that year, and the Conservative Party ran
its own candidate in only three of twenty-nine races.159  In the
State Senate elections, the three third parties put up their own
candidates in only eight of sixty-two races.160  In three of those
races, in which the Conservative Party ran their own candidate,
there was no Republican candidate.161  In the State Assembly
races that year, the third parties put up their own candidate in
only thirteen percent of the races.162
The 2008 election cycle sported similar results.  Third par-
ties cross-endorsed major-party candidates in all but seven of
the twenty-nine Congressional races.163  They also cross-
endorsed all but six of the major-party candidates in the sixty-
two State Senate races,164 and put up their own candidates in
155. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 143, at 1.
156. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, COMPTROLLER ELECTION RETURNS NOV. 7,
2006, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/elections/
2006/general/2006_comp.pdf.
157. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL ELECTION RETURNS
NOV. 7, 2006, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/
elections/2006/general/2006_ag.pdf.
158. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, US SENATE ELECTION RETURNS NOV. 7,
2006, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/elections/
2006/general/2006_ussen.pdf.
159. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, CONGRESSIONAL VOTE – NOV. 7, 2006, at 1-
5 (2006), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/elections/2006/
general/2006_cong.pdf.
160. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, SENATE VOTE – NOV. 7, 2006, at 1-8 (2006),
available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/elections/2006/general/
2006_sen.pdf.
161. Id. at 3-4. The 20th, 27th, and 33rd Senate Districts had no Republican
candidate. Id.
162. See generally N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, ASSEMBLY – VOTE – NOV. 7,
2006 (2006), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/elections/
2006/general/2006_assem.pdf.
163. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, REP. IN CONGRESS ELECTION RETURNS
NOV. 4, 2008, at 1-10 (2008), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYS-
BOE/elections/2008/General/USCongress08.pdf.
164. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, SENATE ELECTION RETURNS NOV. 4, 2008,
at 1-16 (2008), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/elections/
2008/General/NYSSenate08.pdf.  In one race in which the Working Families Party
had their own candidate, the Democrats did not run a candidate. Id. at 12.
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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only eleven percent of the one hundred fifty State Assembly
races.165
Third parties in New York seem to only cross-endorse, even
on the local level.  However, contrary to what fusion advocates
say, this ability to cross-endorse has not created meaningful
third parties in New York.  When a party does not offer its own
candidates, voters do not truly know what values the party em-
braces, and thus, may end up as pawns in political power-seek-
ing deals.  In general, voters rightfully think that their parties
stand for the core principles that their name reflects, but in the
case of third parties in New York, oftentimes, or over time, that
commitment to principle is replaced by a simple need to endorse
the candidate who will earn at least 50,000 votes and ensure
another four years of involvement in the election process, and
the accompanying spoils of success.
D. Disadvantages of Cross-Endorsement
Cross-endorsement limits choices for voters by taking lines
that could go to a more diverse offering of candidates and hand-
ing them over to the entrenched major-party candidate.  Cross-
endorsement also “invites the development of longer and more
complex ballots.”166  In one local election, the complexity of the
ballot led one reporter to write, “[t]he . . . elections appear to be
so intricate that you need a scorecard to tell who is running and
for which party.”167  It is also potentially confusing for voters
when a candidate is endorsed by different parties with no seem-
ing relationship between or among them.  The petitioners in
Timmons noted that in the course of his career, for example,
New York City Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia168 ran under roughly
165. See generally N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, ASSEMBLY ELECTION RE-
TURNS NOV. 4, 2008 (2008), available at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/
elections/2008/General/NYSAssembly08.pdf.
166. Brief for the Petitioners at 42, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
520 U.S. 351 (1997) (No. 95-1608), 1996 WL 435927, at *42.
167. Stephen E. Lipken, Harrison Elections Intricate; Voters Need to Know
“Score”, HARRISON HERALD, Sept. 2007, at 3.
168. LaGuardia was Mayor of New York City from 1934-1945. See generally
THOMAS KESSNER, FIORELLO H. LAGUARDIA (1989).
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nine different party labels.169  In the 1941 campaign alone, his
name appeared on four party lines.170
Cross-endorsement can compromise the major-party candi-
date.  On the one hand, it is very difficult to turn down any en-
dorsement because it could potentially amount to turning down
votes.  As the co-chairman of the Working Families Party put it,
“[T]he line has so much power that no one feels they can walk
away.”171  This puts the candidate in an untenable situation: he
cannot turn down the endorsement because the third party may
then endorse another candidate.  On the other hand, if he ac-
cepts the endorsement and wins, there will presumably be an
expected payoff if the party delivers votes.  In addition, to earn
the endorsement, the major-party candidate may alter his
views or adopt a view which he would not have otherwise es-
poused.  Later, when he runs for another, perhaps higher office,
his previous stance, which he had adopted so as to earn the
votes of the minor party, can create a backlash as he seeks to
hold the banner of the major party.  The major party may not
agree with the position he took in the prior election, and indeed,
the candidate may not agree with it either.  Unfortunately, the
candidate must stand by his former words, and may end up
spending valuable campaign time either backpedaling or finess-
ing his position.  Either way, that type of political behavior,
brought on by the fusion candidacy, is wasteful for voters, who
must spend the time deciphering which of their candidate’s po-
sitions are “real” and which are a matter of political expediency.
Unfortunately, many New York elected officials feel beholden to
the third parties because they perceive that it was those “extra”
votes which made the difference for them.  It is thus unlikely
that this system will change.172
169. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 166, at 43, 1996 WL 435927, at *43.
170. Id. (citing G. Theodore Mitau, Judicial Determination of Political Party
Organizational Autonomy: Some Recent Developments in the Law of Parties (1936-
1957), 42 MINN. L. REV. 245, 256 (1957-1958)).
171. Michael Slackman, Labor-Backed Third Party Emerges as Statewide
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at N46.
172. Spitzer, supra note 129, at 81, analyzes the 1996 New York elections, in
which, similar to the 2006 and 2008 elections, a majority of candidates were cross-
endorsed.  In the House races, twenty-six out of thirty-one candidates were cross-
endorsed.  In the New York State Senate races, fifty-two out of sixty-one were
cross-endorsed, with an average endorsement of 2.5 lines for each candidate.  In
the Assembly, 120 nominees out of 150 received more than one endorsement, with
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss4/5
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E. Should New York Ban Fusion?
No one can argue that there is a benefit to having third par-
ties.  The American electorate has developed “complex associa-
tional preferences within the political marketplace;”173 third
parties help sustain those preferences by encouraging increased
access to political discourse, dissent, and the support of new
ideas.  The abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage, for in-
stance, first found homes in the platforms of minor parties.174
However, third parties that simply endorse the major-party
candidate are pretenders to the throne of alternative ideas.  The
New Party in Minnesota, for instance,
did not seek to enrich political discussion by nominat-
ing its own candidate to present its own political view-
point to the public.  Instead, the New Party sought to
offer as its candidate a very popular political figure
who was already on the ballot as the candidate of an-
other, established party.  This would have done noth-
ing to enhance the choice of candidates available to
voters.  Nor does it in reality present additional ideas
to the voters.  It can hardly be said that Rep. Dawkins
would meaningfully represent one set of positions to
the voters as the candidate of the DFL party and a dif-
ferent set of positions to the voters as the candidate of
the New Party.175
Third parties that simply endorse another party’s candi-
dates amount solely to stepped-up interest groups.  There is a
quid pro quo for the votes they deliver simply because those
votes are registered on a ballot line and the third party can
therefore claim ownership of them.  However, there are other
ways to push for change in Albany or Washington—it need not
an average of 2.3 lines.  The third parties, however, provided the winning edge in
only three per cent of the races.  Note that this does not take into account the fact
that some or all of the third-party voters may have voted on the major-party line
and thus, the three per cent could be an overstatement.
173. Lowell J. Schiller, Imposing Necessary Boundaries on Judicial Discretion
in Ballot Access Cases: Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005), 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 331, 338 (2005).
174. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 23, at 1386.
175. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 166, at 20, 1996 WL 435927, at *20.
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be via a line on the ballot.176  This idea was recognized in Bur-
dick v. Takushi,177 in which the Court stated that the ballot’s
purpose is to elect public officials, not serve an expressive func-
tion.178  Perhaps more important, while there is no doubt that
the freedom of association implicit in the First and Fourteenth
Amendments extends to political parties,179 this right is not
simply for the sake of advancing political parties per se; it is for
the notion that political parties are a vehicle through which in-
dividuals can exercise their First Amendment right to associate
for the advancement of shared beliefs.  There is nothing in the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence which provides that the First
Amendment protects such an expansive interpretation of the
freedom of association.180
Over the past ten years, the Democratic Party has solidified
its dominance in New York State.  Between 1999 and 2009, its
registered voter enrollment increased by 867,369, while Repub-
lican Party enrollment decreased by 121,674.181  With the Dem-
ocrats in control of both the State Senate and the Assembly, it is
feasible that they could choose to pass anti-fusion legislation, as
was done by the Republican Party during the late nineteenth
century throughout most of the rest of the country.  The reason-
ing would be the same: as the dominant party, they do not need
the extra votes of the third-party line and thus, banning fusion
candidacies could limit the Republicans to those voters willing
to vote on the Republican line.  If the New York legislature did
enact an anti-fusion law, it is clear that depending on how they
fashioned it, their action would be secure from constitutional
attack.182  Also clear is the fact that such a change in the law
176. A New York Times editorial called the cross-endorsement system “a per-
mission slip to sell lines on the New York ballot to the highest bidders.”  Editorial,
supra note 134.
177. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
178. Id. at 438.
179. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214. See also Eu v. San Francisco County Demo-
cratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989).
180. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 166, at 14-15, 1996 WL 435927,
at *14-15.
181. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 13, at 8; N.Y. STATE BD. OF
ELECTIONS, TOTAL STATEWIDE ENROLLMENT, at 2 (1999), available at http://www.
elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/county_apr99.pdf.
182. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369-70 (1997)
(upholding the validity of Minnesota’s anti-fusion law).
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would be a shock to the third-party system as it currently func-
tions in New York.  What is less certain, but probable, is that it
would force the weaker major party to focus on its foundational
beliefs and not stray too far from those beliefs in order to please
minor parties whose motives are often questionable.183  Simi-
larly, it would force third parties to develop their own candi-
dates as opposed to spending their time calculating which
major-party candidate can offer them the best chance of ballot
preservation, by way of 50,000 votes every four years.  Only in
this manner can third parties offer voters a true alternative
choice, or at least, a more honest dialogue.
V. Conclusion
The First Amendment protects political parties because po-
litical parties act as a conduit through which constitutional val-
ues, namely the right to associate, are served.
The value of political parties, particularly minor ones, does
not lie simply in their existence; it is in the contribution they
make to the marketplace of ideas.  It is a diverse field of candi-
dates that enriches political discourse and fulfills First Amend-
ment aspirations; while cross-endorsing another party’s
candidate certainly acts as a bootstrap for the minor party, it in
fact takes away from a potentially more diverse slate of candi-
dates in any given election.  In addition, cross-endorsement can
and does act as an invitation to political patronage.  Allowing a
candidate to appear on only one line instead of multiple lines is
not only constitutional, but sensible: it is less confusing, it
keeps candidates true to their ideals, and it promotes actual
competition by reserving ballot space for true alternative
candidates.
183. Alternatively, it could force that party to rethink and adjust some of its
positions so as to welcome more voters into the fold.
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